Contrary to the informed consensus, time travel implies spontaneity (as distinct from chance) so that time travel can only be of the second kind.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I consider time travel both as a real physical possibility and as a means of re-examining fundamental assumptions about time. Though stemming from a new mathematical model of the evolutionary equations of physics, the arguments in this paper are robust enough to be stated with the * cited in S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, reprint 1987, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, p. 51-52.
technicalities only in the background. Such a style of exposition also seems desirable in view of the widespread interest in time-travel.
Background
Thorne and his consortium have proposed 1 time machines based on 'wormhole' solutions, exploiting the fact that the Hilbert-Einstein equations are silent about the (algebraic) topology of spacetime. While the 'wormhole' solutions involve 'exotic matter'-matter with negative mass and positively amusing properties 2 -Gott 3 has shown that closed timelike curves (CTCs) may also arise with cosmic strings. On the other hand, Hawking 4 has argued that there is excellent empirical evidence for chronology protection since we have not been invaded by hordes of tourists from the future.
Two kinds of time-travel
For the purposes of this paper it helps to make an informal distinction between two types of time travel: (i) with time-machines and (ii) without
machines. An example of the second kind of time travel is transfer of information using a retarded interaction going forward in time and an advanced interaction returning backward in time. 5 Access to advanced interactions 6 is possible under the hypothesis of a microphysical tilt in the arrow of time.
7
Strictly speaking, a 'tilt' does not involve any new hypothesis; the usual hypothesis of 'causality' is rejected, so that the evolution of a many-particle system is governed by a different category of (mixed-type functional differential) equations of motion.
3
Time travel of the second kind contemplates only transfer of information without involving physical transport of the traveler's body. Nevertheless, some (diminished) kind of intervention in the past is possible, in principle, because information may be transferred from present to past using advanced interactions, though the bandwidth is a very small fraction of the bandwidth for information transfer to the future using retarded interactions.
Aim
The aim of this paper is to stand on its head the standard conclusion derived from the paradoxes of time travel, 8 especially for the case of time travel without machines.
2 THE PARADOXES OF TIME TRAVEL
The grandfather paradox
The grandfather paradox is well-known: 9 Tim travels into the past to kill his grandfather when Grandfather was yet a boy; but that would mean that 
Mundane time
One could elaborate the paradox as follows. Mundane time has a structure 11 which is past linear and future branching (Fig. 1) . If one bends it around in a circle and joins future to past then either future branching or past linearity must fail, so that one obtains the supercyclic time of 
The paradoxes re-examined
In brief, the informed consensus favours the standard conclusion 14 that time travel is antithetical to spontaneity or 'free will'. I will argue that the exact opposite is true.
Let us re-examine the grandfather paradox, for two of its key features seem to have gone unnoticed. We need to shift our attention from the death of Grandfather to the birth of Tim, that is to the first appearance of Tim in this world. Let us suppose that Tim's 'birth' (i.e. his chronologically earliest appearance in the world) was earlier than his biological birth from his mother's womb. Let us further suppose that the event of Tim's 'birth'
did not go unobserved. Say, Tim's house had earlier been occupied by an eccentric scientist, who had called another half-a-dozen scientists for tea.
Tim, being a tyro at time travel, appeared bang in the midst of this tea party.
The scientists, true to their profession, merely observed and theorised: they did not hop around or interfere in what they took to be a demonstration to challenge their theoretical capabilities, specially arranged by their eccentric host (who had disappeared into the kitchen). Naturally, they were all blase enough to regard it as a magic trick in bad taste. (Tim materialised with one foot on a saucer, and spilled tea on a guest.)
But we know better. We know that, however hard they might have tried, the scientists could not have found an explanation for the fact which was presented to them on a platter-no causal explanation that is. We know that Tim's appearance at the eccentric tea party really had nothing to do with anything prior to the tea party; it was causally inexplicable, spontaneous, so to say. The event of Tim's birth could be explained only with reference to the future.
Popper's pond
In the non-mechanical mode of time-travel, involving advanced interactions, The pond paradox is now seen to arise from Popper's metaphysical stipulation that all phenomena must admit a causal explanation, so that phenomena not admitting a causal explanation cannot possibly occur. This position is reminiscent of the Stoics who derived heimarmene (fate) from eiro (string beads), so that the evolution of the world was analogous to moving beads on a necklace; the slightest spontaneous swerve of the atoms (Epicurean clinamen)
would break the string: 'the cosmos would break up and be shattered. . . if some uncaused movement were to be introduced into it. 16 Perhaps it is necessary to restate that a metaphysical stipulation ('everything must have an antecedent cause'), as used e.g. by Hippocrates, may not be used to decide 
The empirical evidence
The absence of hordes of tourists from the future is, therefore, no evidence against time travel of the second kind. It would be enough if we occasionally observe some spontaneous events.
The mechanization of spontaneity
A key feature of spontaneity in the above sense is that spontaneity cannot be mechanized, i.e., though time travel may be possible, time machines are not: only time travel of the second kind is possible. Popper's conclusions 
Spontaneity and chance
The relevance of Maxwell's demon is the following. Spontaneity, in the sense proposed above, differs from the notion of 'chance' in the sense of probabilistic ('stochastic') evolution, such as that of a stochastic process, where the probabilities of future states can be computed once the past states are known.
(The meaning we have assigned to 'chance' is related to contemporary customary usage amongst physicists: for the last hundred years or so, it has been argued that probabilistic evolution accounts for entropy increase within classical reversible dynamics.) Mathematically, the difference is that evolution involving such 'chance' may be modeled by stochastic differential equations (Fig. 6 ), categorically distinct from the mixed-type functional differential equations which model evolution involving a tilt in the arrow of time. In physical terms, a key difference is that chance corresponds to 'mixing' while spontaneity, in the above sense, corresponds to 'sorting'.
That is, if the implicit assumption of some kind of 'mixing' or quasiergodicity is acceptable as a characteristic feature of 'chance' in the sense of probabilistic evolution, one might say that 'chance' results in an increase of entropy, whereas spontaneity in the above sense (e.g. a converging ripple) 
CONCLUSIONS
Time travel conflicts not with choice but with 'causality': if two-way interaction with the future is permitted, one can no longer hang on to 'causality' in the sense of demanding explanations exclusively from the past. Interactions propagating from future to present imply the occurrence of events that are causally inexplicable. Under the circumstances of time travel, one must allow for the reality of such spontaneous events, which differ from 'chance' events in creating order instead of destroying it. The mechanization of spontaneity, however, is impossible, so that time travel can only be of the second kind.
Appendix
A causal explanation of anticipatory phenomena is mathematically impossible: following the referee's suggestion to keep the paper self-contained, we reproduce here from Ref. 7 , some mathematical details of the argument.
First, let us see why a teleological explanation of history-dependent phenomena is mathematically impossible. Fig. 3 shows three solutions of the retarded functional differential equation (FDE)
where b is a continuous function which vanishes outside [0, 1], and satisfies
For example,
For t ≤ 0, the FDE (1) reduces to the ordinary differential equation (ODE) x (t) = 0 , so that, for t ≤ 0, x(t) = k for some constant k (= x(0)). The actual solutions shown in the graph were obtained numerically, using the retard package of Hairer et al.
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In the advanced case, as suggested by Fig. 4 , the argument is the timesymmetric counterpart of the above argument. In this case, the equation solved was the analogous advanced FDE
where the function b has the same properties as before, except that
The reasoning proceeds in an entirely analogous manner. For t ≥ 1, the FDE (5) reduces to the ODE x (t) = 0, so that, for t ≥ 1, x(t) = k for some constant k (= x(1)). 5 shows solutions of the mixed-type equation
where b has the same properties as in (6) , and the continuous function a now has support on the interval [2, 3] , and satisfies
The solutions may be obtained by combining the reasoning used in the preceding two cases.
Physically, retarded FDE arise as the equations of motion of charged particles, using the Heaviside-Lorentz force law, and assuming fully retarded Lienard-Wiechert potentials. 7, 20, 21 Mixed-type equations arise as the equations of motion of charged particles in the case where most electromagnetic radiation is retarded, but some of it may be advanced, i.e., we use a convex combination of retarded and advanced Lienard-Wiechert potentials. This possibility has often been excluded on metaphysical grounds, without studying the immediate empirical consequence (of spontaneity), here and now, of this assumption.
Finally, in the case of Fig. 6 the equation solved was a stochastic differential equation of the type dX t = a(t, X t )dt + b(t, X t )dw(t) (11) where w(t) is the standard Brownian motion (Wiener process). The background vector field relates to the deterministic part of this equation, obtained using only the drift function a(t, X t ) and setting the dispersion function b(t, X t ) to zero. The sample paths shown in the figure were obtained using this author's package stochode for the solution of stochastic differential equations (SDE's) driven by Brownian or Lévy motion.
Given the vast difference between the mathematical theory underlying SDE's ('chance') and that underlying mixed-type FDE's ('spontaneity') it is surprising why it should be hard to discriminate between the physical consequences of the two. In the case of SDE's ('chance') the future is epistemically uncertain since (a) the past is uncertain, and (b) the relation of past to future is probabilistic rather than deterministic. In the case of mixed-type FDE's ('spontaneity'), the future is ontically uncertain, regardless of knowledge of the past, because past does not entirely determine the future
Notes and References

